

Message Text

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W
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O 041916Z JAN 74

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1090

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE

USMISSION GENEVA

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 0078

EXDIS

EO 11652:U/GDS-1

TAGS: PFOR XF IS US PINT

SUBJ: EBAN'S VIEWS ON GENEVA CONFERENCE

GENEVA FOR STERNER

SUMMARY. IN LUNCHEON CONVERSATION THIS AFTERNOON, EBAN SAID THAT THERE WAS NO NEED FOR SPECIAL UNSC MEETING SINCE GOI WAS NOT BLOCKING PASSAGE OF SUPPLIES TO 3RD ARMY. ISRAELI THREATS THAT CONTINUED EGYPTIAN CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS COULD CAUSE BREAKDOWN OF SIX POINTS AGREEMENT APPARENTLY HAD BEEN EFFECTIVE. EBAN STATED THAT US/USSR/GOE/GOI INTERESTS IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON SEPARATION OF FORCES AUGURED WELL FOR SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF DISENGAGEMENT TALKS BY END OF JANUARY. SOVIETS HAD ACQUIRED PRIVILEGED STATUS IN MIDDLE EAST THROUGH CO-CHAIRMANSHIP OF GENEVA CONFERENCE. THEY UNDERSTOOD IMPORTANCE OF EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT IN PRESERVING POSITIVE SUPERPOWER DETENTE RELATIONSHIP. SADAT ALSO STOOD TO GAIN FROM DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD RELIEVE CAIRO REFUGEE PROBLEM, IMPROVE ARMY MORALE, AND REDUCE LEVERAGE OF HAWKS FOR RENEWED WAR. WITH ISRAEL. FONMINS PROBABLY WOULD HAVE TO RECONVENE IN GENEVA AT END OF JANUARY TO DISCUSS NEXT STAGES, PARTICULARLY WHETHER ISSUES CONCERNING EGYPT, JORDAN AND POSSIBLY SYRIA SHOULD BE CONSIDERED
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SIMULTANEOUSLY OR SEQUENTIALLY IN MONTHS AHEAD. GOI HOPED THAT NEXT PHASE WOULD INCLUDE DISCUSSION ON SUBSTANCE OF PEACE. EBAN SAISSTHAT FUTURE UNEF STATUS WOULDHAVE TO BE CLARIFIED, AT LEAST TO EXTENT OF US-GOI UNDERSTANDING ON SUBJECT.

EBAN SAID THAT NEW GOVERNMENT RECONSTRUCTING PRESENT COALITION PROBABLY COULD BE FORMED WITHIN ON MONTH AND EMPHASIZED THAT PARLIMENTARY MAJORITY STILL EXISTED IN SUPPORT OF PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE IN EXCHANGE FOR PEACE AGREEMENT. I FOUND EBAN RELAXED AND HE HAVE EVERY INDICATION THAT HE EXPECTED TO SERVE AS ISRAEL'S FOREIGN MINISTER IN NEW GOVERNMENT. END SUMMARY.

1. I HAD LUNCH WITH FONMIN EBAN AT 1:00 THIS AFTERNOON AT HIS REQUEST. ALSO PRESENT WERE: EVRON MFA, BEN TSUR OF FONMIN'S OFFICE, DCM AND POLOFF HIRSCH. EBAN USED OCCASION FOR WIDE RANGING GENERAL DISCUSSION, HIGHLIGHTS OF WHICH ARE REPORTED BELOW.

2. SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING: EBAN STARTED THE CONVERSATION BY NOTING THAT GOI WAS NOT SUSPENDING MOVEMENT OF SUPPLIES TO THE 3RD ARMY, ELIMINATING NEED FOR SC MEETING. GOI THREAT, MADE BY GENERAL GUR AT GENEVA, AND MORE VAGUELY BY DAYAN AT AIRPORT YESTERDAY., THAT CONTINUED EGYPTIAN CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS COULD LEAD GOI TO ST IR MOVEMENT OF SUPPLIES SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN EFFECTIVE. ISRAELI POSITION WAS THAT SIX-POINT AGREEMENT WAS AN INTEGRAL ONE REQUIRING COMPLIANCE WITH ALL POINTS ON BOTH SIDES.

3. FAHMI/GROMYKO MEETING: EBAN OBSERVED THAT FAHMI VISIT TO MOSCOW WAS FOR OSTENSIBLE PURPOSE OF GETTING SOVIET VIEWS ON SHAPE OF DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT. HE SUGGESTED THAT REAL REASON MIGHT BE GOE FEAR THAT GENEVA CONFERENCE MIGHT FAIL TO MOVE FORWARD AFTER DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT. GOE WANTED SOVIETS TO HELP PREVENT THIS FROM HAPPENING. EBAN ADDED THAT FAHMI WANTED TO DEMONSTRATE EGYPT'S "EVEN-HANDED POSITON" BY BALANCING HIS MEETING LAST MONTH WITH SECRETARY BY VISIT TO MOSCOW.

4. SOVIET GENEVA ROLE' EBAN SAID THAT CO-CHAIRMANSHIP OF GENEVA CONFERENCE GAVE SOVIETS PRIVILEGED STATUS IN MIDDLE SECRET

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EAST, ADDING THAT SOVIETS AGREED WITH USG RE IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING BIRITISH AND FRENCH OUT AND LIMITING UNSYG ROLE. GENEVA, HE THOUGHT, FITS IN WITH SOVIET DETENTE POLICY, INCLUDING JOINT US-USSR INTEREST IN KEEPING MIDEAST CONFLICT UNDER CONTROL WITHOUT NECESSARILY AGREEING ON ALL POINTS. SOVIETS ALSO WANT TO PREVENT SECRETARY FROM RUNNING ENTIRE SHOW. EBAN ADDED THAT HIS MEETING WITH GROMYKO HAD NOT BEEN ANNOUNCED IN SOVIET UNION EXCEPT IN HEBREW RADIO BROADCAST.

5. DAYAN/KISSINGER MEETING: REPORTED IN TEL AVIV 0077. NOTAL

6. DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT: EBAN SAID THAT HE PERCEIVED

COMMON FOUR PARTY INTEREST (US/USSR/GOE/GOI) IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON SEPARATION OF FORCES. HE BELIEVED THAT TALKS SHOULD CONTINUE THROUGHOUT JANUARY, SO THAT SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION COULD HOPEFULLY COINCIDE WITH FORMATION NEW GOI. DISENGAGEMENT SHOULD BE EXCLUSIVE ISSUE AT GENEVA THIS MONTH. GOE HAS STRONG INTEREST IN REACHING AGREEMENT: (A) SADAT COULD DEPICT REOPENING OF SUEZ CANAL AS GREAT POLITICAL VICTORY; (B) GOE WOULD GET MILITARY POSITION ON SOUTHERN SECTOR OF CANAL WHICH IT LACKED UNTIL NOW; (C) MORALE OF EGYPTIAN ARMY WOULD BE IMPROVED; (D) REBUILDING SUEZ CANAL CITIES WOULD ALLOW ESTIMATED ONE MILLION REFUGEES TO RETURN FROM CAIRO TO DELTA REGION; AND (E) SEPARATION OF FORCES WOULD REDUCE LEVERAGE OF HAWKS ON SADAT TO DEMAND RENEWAL OF WAR. MAIN DRAWBACK FOR GOE, EBAN OBSERVED, WOULD BE FEAR OF CRYSTALLIZATION OF SITUATION WITHOUT FURTHER DIPLOMATIC MOVEMENT.

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W

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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1091

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE

USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE

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7. SOVIET INTEREST IN DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT: EBAN SAID THAT HIS SURPRISE AT GENEVA WAS INTENSE SOVIET INTEREST IN AN ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT. GROYSMKO HAD TOLD HIM PRIVATELY THAT GOI/USSR DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS COULD BE RENEWED IF THERE WAS "IMPORTANT PROGRESS" WHICH EBAN INTERPRETED (PERHAPS OPTIMISTICALLY) TO MEAN A DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT. EBAN BELIEVED SOVIET MOTIVATIONS WERE (A) TO OPEN CANAL; (B) TO AVOID REPETITION OF OCTOBER 24 CRISIS (C) TO AVOID DANGER OF US/USSR CONFRONTATION AND/OR EXERCISE IN NUCLEAR DETERRANCE AND (D) TO SAFEGUARD US/SOVIET DETENTE. MAIN PROBLEM NOW WAS THAT VINOGRADOV WAS STILL TRYING TO PUSH INTO MILITARY COMMITTEE MEETINGS. SOVIETS WANTED TO AVOID PRECEDENT WHICH COULD EXCLUDE THEM FROM FUTURE WORKING GROUPS? EBAN NOTED THAT AMERICANS AND SOVIETS CLEARLY HAVE DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES AS CO-CHAIRMEN, WITH AMERICANS WILLING TO REMAIN IN BACKGROUND AND SOVIETS

WANTING TO INSERT THEMSELVES ACTIVELY IN WORKING GROUPS.

8. NEXT CONFERENCE PHASE: EBAN SAID THE FONMINS PROBABLY WOULD HAVE TO RECONVENE IN PLENARY SESSION AT END OF JANUARY TO DISCUSS NEXT PROCEDURAL STAGES, IT WAS TOO SOON TO DECIDE THIS NOW. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO AVOID ANTICLIMATIC LETDOWN. FONMINS WOULD HAVE TO DECIDE WHETHER ISSUES CONCERNING EGYPT, JORDAN (AND POSSIBLY SYRIA) SHOULD BE TAKEN UP SIMULTANEOUSLY
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PRIVATE VIEW THAT NEXT STEP SHOULD

INCLUDE DISCUSSION OF SUBSTANCE OF PEACE. WITHOUT COMPLETE PEACE, HE NOTED, GOE COULD NOT EXPECT COMPLETE GOI WITHDRAWAL. ARAB RESERVATIONS RE "COMPLETE PEACE" WOULD HELP GOI INTERNATIONAL IMAGE RE IT RESERVATIONS ON "COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL". GOI REALIZED THAT NOT ALL ELEMENTS OF "COMPLETE PEACE" COULD BE OBTAINED RIGHT AWAY.

9. UNEF: EBAN SAID THAT SOME TIME IN FUTURE US AND GOI WOULD HAVE TO REACH UNDERSTANDING ON UNEF STATUS, WHETHER SIMPLY TO RENEW ITS PRESENT SIX MONTH MANDATE OR TO ARRIVE AT MORE PRECISE FORMULATION RE ITS ROLE. GOI CONCERN WAS TO AVOID RECURRENCE OF 1967 SITUATION IN WHICH GOE UNILATERALLY FORCED UNEF WITHDRAWAL. UNEF COULD NEVER HAVE PHYSICAL CAPABILITY TO RESIST EXPULSION ORDER. HE RECOGNIZED US MIGHT PREFER TO APPROACH PROBLEM "EMPIRICALLY" AND JUST RENEW MANDATE IN SC. NEVERTHELESS, GOI BELIEVED IT IMPORTANT FOR AT LEAST ISRAELI-US AGREEMENT ON UNEF, ITS ROLE AND FUTURE.

10. JORDAN: EBAN NOTED THAT JORDAN FELT LEFT OUT AT GENEVA CONFERENCE. GOJ HAD NOT PARTICIPATED IN BEHIND-THE-SCENES MEETINGS. ACCORDING TO ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE, EGYPT HAD NOT MET WITH JORDANIAN DELEGATION AT ALL. THIS APPARENT FRUSTRATION HAD LED FONMIN RAFAI TO SUGGEST GOI/GOJ DISENGAGEMENT TALKS NEAR END OF FIRST PHASE. EBAN HAD DEFLECTED PROBLEM ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS. RE WITHDRAWAL OF JORDANIAN ARMY FROM SYRIA, EBAN NOTED THAT HUSSEIN'S RATIONALE WAS TO PROTECT JORDANIAN SECURITY IN CASE OF JORDAN/ISRAEL WAR WHICH COULD BE BYPRODUCT OF RENEWED HOSTILITIES WITH SYRIA. HE AGREED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WERE MANY COMPLEXITIES IN THE CURRENT JORDANIAN/SYRIAN RELATIONSHIP.

11. SYRIA: EBAN SAID THERE WERE TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT ON SYRIAN NON-PARTICIPATION AT GENEVA: (A) SARG PREFERRED WAR TO PEACE CONFERENCE AND (B) SARG WANTED TO PUSH ITSELF INTO CONFERENCE AT LATER DATE. EBAN ADDED THAT SARG PARTICIPATION IN ISRAELI VIEW DEPENDED ONLY ON RESOLUTION OF POW ISSUE.

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12. PALESTINIANS: NEITHER SOVIETS NOR OTHERS HAD RAISED PALESTINIAN ISSUE AT GENEVA. EMPHASIS HAD BEEN ON STATES' PARTICIPATION WHICH SERVED TO STRENGTHEN JORDANIAN POSITION. PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATIONS CANNOT BE HAPPY ABOUT GENEVA, HE NOTED, AND CURRENT SITUATION RE PALESTINIANS SUITED BOTH ISRAEL AND JORDAN JUST FINE.

13. ELECTION: EBAN THOUGHT NEW GOVERNMENT RECONSTITUTING CURRENT COALITION COULD BE FORMED WITHIN ONE MONTH. COALITION PROBLEMS WOULD ARISE AT STAGE OF GENEVA CONFERENCE IN WHICH POSSIBLE SETTLEMENT

WITH JORDAN WOULD COME UP. EBAN ADDED THAT IN NEW KNESSET NO MORE THAN 49 OF 120 MEMBERS (LIKUD AND NRP AS COZKLRNS# WEST BANK) OPPOSED PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE IN EXCHANGE FOR PEACE AGREEMENT. HE CLAIMED LABOR ALIGNMENT HAD LOST VOTE TO FAR LEFT PARTIES COMMITTED TO PEACE, WHICH IS CONTRARY TO GENERALLY ACCEPTED VIEW THAT LOSS WAS PRIMARILY TO THE RIGHT. LIKUD'S INCREASED SUPPORT REFLECTED PROTEST VOTE AGAINST CONDUCT OF WAR; SOME SUPPORT ALSO BASED ON CHARISMATIC APPEAL OF GENERAL SHARON. ATTITUDE OF SOLDIERS WOULD BE CLEAR WHEN FINAL COUNT WAS IN, BUT THIS IS NOT EXPECTED TO HAVE SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON

CURRENT PROJECTED RESULTS. LIKUD HAS ALREADY BEGUN TO MOUNT CAMPAIGN AGAINST SIGNIFICANT PROCESS TOWARDS DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT BEFORE NEW GOI IS FORMED. EBAN STATED GOI WOULD NOT BE INFLUENCED BY THIS ARGUMENT, BUT REPEATED NEED FOR AGREEMENT TO BE RATIFIED BY NEW GOVERNMENT.

COMMENT: EBAN WAS RELAXED DURING COURSE OF APPROXIMATELY TWO HOUR CONVERSATION AND GAVE EVERY INDICATION THAT HE EXPECTED TO SERVE AS ISRAEL'S FOREIGN MINISTER IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT. I ALSO RECEIVED A CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT HE EXPECTED TO PLAY A LEADING ROLE IN THE GENEVA TALKS ONCE THE

DETAILS OF THE MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN ACCEPTED BY ALL PARTIES.
KEATING

NOTE BY OCT: #AS RECEIVED, CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 27 JUL 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: ARMISTICE, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, PEACE TALKS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 04 JAN 1974
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974TELAV00078
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: n/a
Film Number: P750004-0074
From: TEL AVIV
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740174/abbrzaizy.tel
Line Count: 260
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 03 JUN 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <03 JUN 2002 by boyleja>; APPROVED <18 DEC 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: EBAN'S VIEWS ON GENEVA CONFERENCE
TAGS: PFOR, PINT, XF, IS, US, (EBAN, ABBA)
To: STATE NIACT INFO AMMAN
BEIRUT
CAIRO
GENEVA
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005